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Enjoy their symptom:  
Of Woman, men and other interesting figures in Greek literary texts  
 
Zizek has noted that in Lacanian terms the woman can often be described as a 
symptom of man and discusses male enjoyment, or lack of enjoyment, via a vis this 
formidable Other (1992). In this paper we have tried to do the opposite, focus our 
enjoyment on men’s symptoms. Within this context we are charting a map of female 
figures appearing as men’s symptoms in the literary work of Gregorios Xenopoulos 
(1867-1951), a well known Greek writer whose work bridges the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. Was it however pure enjoyment that led us to such an endeavour? 
Not really, although it has actually played a big part in inciting us to conduct research 
for this project. This paper is part of a collaborative on-going work within the matrix 
of discourses, phantasies and power relations involved in the construction of female 
subjectivity in fin-de-siècle Greece. In excavating the emergence of the modern 
woman we draw on psychoanalytic theories as well as Foucauldian insights. Butler 
has noted that, ‘thinking the theory of power together with a theory of the psyche [is] 
a task that has been eschewed by writers in both Foucauldian and psychoanalytic 
orthodoxies’ (1997:3) 1
 
. Responding to Butler’s invitation, we will attempt to 
contribute to the dialogue between the two, using both perspectives in mapping the 
conditions of possibility for the figure of the woman to emerge from.  
At the turn of the 19th century, the emergence of the modern woman in Greece is 
inextricably linked to profound socio-cultural changes, political and histrorical 
upheavals and the gradual passage from a predominantly agricultural economy to 
capitalism (Veloudis 1983:58). Yet, at a time when talk of personal values and 
individuality begin to dominate the male world, the woman is expected to be content 
with being defined in relation to her husband (Varika, 1994:150). Even when her 
individuality is acknowledged – almost exclusively in intellectual circles (Varika, 
1994:150) – she is still seen as vulnerable and in need of protection.  
 
This is the background against which the early feminist movement in Greece seeks to 
make a difference and in which Xenopoulos writes about women. His massive work is 
inhabited by a wide variety of heroines, ranging from the mildly non-conformist to the 
hysterical saint and from the rebellious daughter who claims her freedom through 
death to the 18th century peasant who drives a stake into the dead lover’s heart in 
order to stop him from haunting her dreams. Unlike many others who turned to the 
vanishing village world for inspiration and consolation and idealised the rural life in 
reaction to the stark socio-political realities, Xenopoulos primarily writes urban 
novels (Beaton 1999: 100). Compared to many of his colleagues who bemoan 
women’s liberties or conceal their ambivalence towards them by claiming that the city 
is too dangerous a place for such delicate creatures (Varika 1994:155), Xenopoulos 
writes about women in an unprejudiced and straightforward manner. What is more, he 
frequents the literally salon of Kalliroi Parren (1859-1940), a pioneer feminist and 
editor of the first feminist journal in Greece, and declares himself a gynophile, 
supporting the early feminist movement2
 
.   
The three short stories we are discussing in this paper emerge from this tense 
background. Clearly, Xenopoulos is not the only force shaping the dominant 
paradigm of the constitution of the female subject in Greece but he nevertheless plays 
an important role, both as a major literary figure of his time and a stable presence in 
the literary curricula in all three educational sectors ever after.  
 
Compared to Xenopoulos’ numerous other short stories which are snapshots of real 
life seen through the eyes of an uninvolved narrator, ‘The Bracelet’, ‘The Life and 
Death of Argiroula’ and the ‘Madman with the Red Lillies’ are first person accounts 
of traumatic experiences which converge on the themes of madness, death and the 
failure of love. ‘The Bracelet’ is the confession of the break up of the narrator’s 
marriage, attributed to his jealousy and to his wife’s persistence in wearing a cheap 
bracelet, the attachment to which she refuses to explain. The second story is an 
idiosyncratic deathbed scene in which a young woman, Argyroula, arranges a lavish 
family dinner as a farewell to life. In the ‘Madman with the Red Lillies’, the story of a 
young man’s morbid obsession with his dead beloved is told by the narrator-friend in 
a Poesque manner.  
 
All three stories explore the tensions in the relations between the two sexes which are 
explicitly constructed as oppositional: men fail to deal with women in a ‘viable’ 
manner and women resist being dealt with in a predictable fashion. There is no 
apportioning of blame or taking sides: both sexes are and are not responsible for the 
breakdown of relationships. There is no possibility for mediation or reparation: 
madness and death cut human affairs short or precipitate a hasty conclusion. The ‘I’ 
speaks of a traumatic experience which remains painful for a long time but being a 
masculine ‘I’ also attempts to keep the pain at bay.  
 
Through psychoanalytic lenses, ‘The Bracelet’, ‘The Life and Death of Argyroula’ 
and ‘The Madman with the Red Lillies’ can be read as narratorial/authorial fantasies 
(Segal 1993: 168), arrangements of conscious and unconscious elements which speak 
a truth when considered in their totality and exceed the narrator/author’s conscious 
intentions in advancing effective social criticism or in championing the women’s 
cause. These fantasies can further be framed within a Foucauldian gendered power 
relations matrix within which they receive their validity as stories emerging from and 
representing a social and historical reality.   
 
Below, each story is introduced and discussed separately with a view to establishing, 
first, how feminine and masculine subjectivities are represented in man’s speech; 
second, how unintended excesses and interruptions occur in the problematic 
representation of women; and third, how madness and ultimately death come to play a 
significant role in the power relations between the two sexes.  
 
 
The Bracelet 
 
The Bracelet is a straightforward confession of a man’s failure to keep the woman he 
loved. The narrative follows the conventions of the confession: by exposing his folly 
to public scrutiny, the narrator both hopes to find consolation in the act and come to 
terms with the significant rupture in his life. The story begins with him observing that 
his fiancée, Mary, is wearing a cheap snake-shaped glass bracelet. Deeming it 
unworthy of his beloved, he buys her a gold and coral one in the same shape: ‘Why 
deny it?’ he observes, ‘there is no better symbol for the woman since Eve’s time’ 
(1914:96). And since the woman has always been perceived as a surface upon which 
man’s affluence and social position are inscribed (Bordo, 1990), the young lover does 
nothing more than follow the dominant conventions. Upon receiving the gift, Mary 
shows appreciation but later never remembers to wear it. The fiancé begins to think 
that something is wrong. Unable to hide his growing discomfort, he pressures Mary to 
promising that she will start wearing his bracelet: ‘the expression on her face was sad 
and so was her voice. Her decision was like a sacrifice for the sake of my love’ (p.97) 
When he returns from a short journey, she welcomes him with both pieces of 
jewellery, one on each wrist. When he firmly demands that she keeps only his, she 
replies: ‘I could not do you that favour’ (p. 101) only to capitulate and promise to 
comply to his demand the following day. The narrator is now convinced that the glass 
snake has a secret history. Getting to the truth becomes his obsession. He will only be 
able to know who Mary is if he either persuades her to get rid of her old cheap 
bracelet in a symbolic act of submission or by making her tell him the truth about it, 
probably disclosing her untold past, the truth about herself:  
 
I was determined that either it would go or I would leave, or die or commit 
suicide. I was in a state of permanent agitation. An Othello is sometimes awoken 
in men’s souls, far more ferocious that Shakespeare’s. Oh, the jealously inspired 
by the past of one’s fiancée (p.100) 
 
Mary, however, has strategically chosen to dodge his obsession by neither refusing 
nor accepting the conditions he is trying to impose upon her. A Foucauldian power 
game is being staged between them. Neither of them can be easily proclaimed as 
powerful or powerless. Power seems to be constantly circulating between the two 
(Foucault, 1990) as they seem to occupy different/interchangable subject positions 
vis-à-vis the truth/power regime that sustains and is sustained by the question of the 
bracelet. However, Foucault draws an important line of distinction between relations 
of power as fields of games where freedom can be exercised and relations of 
domination which needs resisting  (1991a).  
 
Further pressure on Mary to part with the old bracelet results in flat refusal:  
 
Listen. You want something that cannot be done. This bracelet – I cannot take it 
off my hand. As a favour to you I won’t be wearing yours together with it, since 
you seem to mind so much, but that’s all. I will be wearing this one to my grave. 
Do not ask me about it. I will never tell you anything. Only, if you think this is 
unacceptable, here, take back your engagement ring. I will be very sorry if you 
do, because I love you very much and I want to live with you but if you are 
going to deprive me of my bracelet I will prefer to live alone. This is the 
explanation I had to give you. Now do as you wish (p.101) 
 
Mary wins this battle because after the ultimatum the fiancé acknowledges that his 
love is greater than his obsession and promises to forget the incident and suppress his 
jealousy. ‘But deep in my heart’ he says, ‘I still hoped that one day my love would 
prevail upon Mary’ (p. 102) Clearly his love is not about reciprocity but about 
conquest, in line with the dominant/conventional heterosexual discourse of how a man 
can love a woman.  
 
They marry soon afterwards but they don’t live happily ever after. Just a year has 
passed when the narrator decides to check how far his love has eroded her resistance 
and broaches the issue of the bracelet again. He finds her as determined as ever. This 
is when a male friend advices him to act like a man and assert his authority. Incensed 
by the challenge to his masculinity and by the fear of appearing weak to others, the 
narrator returns home determined to have his way but finds Marry asleep:  
 
The red lampshade was shining patches of blood-red light around the room. A 
big patch was covering half of Mary’s face, the other half blotting the pillow. 
Her hand was dangling out of the sheets, as if it were dead. The cursed blue 
thing was glittering in the red light and Mary was blissfully asleep in the snake’s 
sweet embrace, dreaming sweet dreams. The spectacle hit me. It angered me, 
made my blood rush. A red cloud came over me and my heart started pounding. 
The idea of the crime was conceived there and then. I planned it there and then. 
I did not think of anything else, of the consequences. I was perhaps thinking that 
this was the only way to get out of this predicament once and for all. But then 
again was I in control of myself? Did I know what I was doing? (pp.103-4) 
 
And so he breaks the bracelet in two. Materiality, the broken bracelet, fills the 
communication void of the couple’s relationship. While initially the protagonist 
seemed to accommodate himself within the paradigm of ‘complicit masculinities’ 
(Connell, 2000), the provokation by the other causes him to shift to the register of 
‘hegemonic masculinities’. Thus he responds to his interpellation as a man and, at 
last, the clash of man and woman culminates in male violence, an open manifestation 
of his power.  
 
In psychoanalytic terms, masculinity is caught in a visual trap twice over: in seeing 
something that is not there (secret) and in wanting to be seen as something one is not 
or does not know how to be (an aggressive male). Xenopoulos seems to concur with 
Lacan who locates masculinity and femininity in the imaginary order. He further 
illustrates another psychoanalytic position, that the aggression directed towards the 
other has their roots in the ego which is built upon an internal conflict (Boothby 
1991:39-45), structured as it is as a rival to itself and condemned to chasing an elusive 
ideal. In the case of the bracelet, man’s internal clash is reactivated by the woman’s 
secret, an object that does not exist but willed into existence and further nourished by 
the social-paternal Other in the eyes of whom one must appear manly and assertive. In 
a similar manner, the demand for love extended to the woman as a polite but firm 
request, also reveals aggression. Aggression breaks out as actual violence when 
attention is diverted from her as animate object of love to a seemingly unrelated 
inanimate object, the bracelet. Each new turn in the story, further exposes the 
fantasmatic and private origin of man’s obsession with ‘her truth’ and ‘her secret’ and 
the imaginary nature of his superiority. However, the matrix of power relations within 
which man’s violent performance is enacted, produces tangible effects. [His] woman 
who has up to that point eschewed his jealous demand is violently disrupted. Mary 
wakes up immediately with what he describes as a madwoman’s expression on her 
face. She shouts:  
 
You broke it! You broke it! You broke every bond between us. You are a liar. 
You are silly, egotistic, nosy, bad. No one gave this bracelet to me, there is no 
story behind it, no secret. It was just a whim, I was wearing it because of a 
whim. I hate you, I detest you. I do not want to see you again (p. 104). 
 
Now she rises above him both morally and ethically. She simply leaves and he knows 
that he deserves it. A few years later a mutual friend informs the narrator that his ex-
wife remarried in Istanbul and that she always wears a snake-shaped bracelet of coral 
and gold around her wrist. 
 
But who is this woman and what does her disappearance mean? By leaving, she 
literally becomes the strange other. Because of that the narrator can use the active 
voice in remarking ‘that night I divorced my wife’ (p.105) although we know it was 
she who left town for ever. What is more, her secret is disclosed as pure nothingness: 
it was just a whim, he was just a fool, she was just stubborn – or wasn’t she? In the 
narrative plot of ‘The Bracelet’ we discern a well known Foucauldian hypothesis: 
when all is said and done, there is no truth to be disclosed about the bracelet and the 
whole story is deployed as a series of false discursive constructions enacted on the 
scene of gendered power relations. This Foucauldian stance – as indeed all 
Foucauldian stances – focuses on the how of the event, rather than the why of it.3
 
 The 
latter is better addressed in the discourse of psychoanalysis. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective the answer to: ‘what does this woman want and 
why does she leave?’ is deceptively simple: she wants a cheap, glass, snake-shaped 
bracelet which she refuses to part with or explain. At the same time, Mary’s departure 
signifies the profound changes in the relationship between the two sexes. As woman 
breaks away for the first time from marriage and love, from the symbolic relation and 
the imaginary bond respectively, she upsets the stable referents of male subjectivity. 
Her vanishing activates a fantasy in which she harms, traumatises and castrates. 
Xenopoulos uncovers this effect on the male psyche beyond his contemporaries’ 
attempt to hide it behind the helplessness of the ‘vulnerable creature’.  
 
Mary’s radical emancipation, however, cuts both ways. In Freud’s phallic economy, 
the bracelet could be considered as a substitute phallus and Mary’s adherence to it as 
her reluctance to forgo the infantile organisation and accede to genital sexuality 
(Freud, 1991a:298). This economy, just as the society she lives in, label woman as 
problematic. How, then, is she to define herself outside man’s aggressive phallic 
demand for love? How is she to represent herself as other than the one who submits to 
his demand to be her only phallus? To his credit, Xenopoulos manages to show that 
this is an important issue in the modern world, although he avoids taking sides and 
upsetting his mixed readership. He is at pains to show that the woman’s purpose is 
neither to be excluded from the organised society nor to rent the traditional social 
fabric. However, the pragmatic limitations imposed on her in the attempt to represent 
herself for herself, mean that her only option is to turn around the signification which 
fabricates her subjection. Hence she juxtaposes her little mystery, the bracelet, to 
being herself wholly turned into a mystery and resists male curiosity which reads too 
much into a piece of jewellery. Hence she appears stubborn, unyielding and 
completely set in her ways. And this, we are repeatedly told, is a very conscious 
decision.  
 
Thus Mary’s signification starts with (re)claiming the contentious object, the bracelet, 
and giving it a different interpretation. Now it functions as a pure signifier devoid of 
meaning, which signifies her desire never to be totally known and possessed. 
Deprived of any other means of signification and wishing to resist the convention that 
wants her to be only for the other and through the other, woman reconstitutes herself 
and her intergity with a purely symbolic act. She uses the symbolic in its symbolic 
clarity, without confusing it with the imaginary demand for love and, most important, 
without falling for the latter. Thus, the bracelet, an everyday object which is assigned 
the value of a signifier, becomes the signifier of the symbolic Other, her symbolic 
Other, a space that will remain obscure and loaded with imaginary fears for the male. 
But then again, this signification inevitably marginalises her, because, by choosing to 
construct her Other as the bit excluded from the dominant Other, she is turning herself 
into the Other of the dominant order. And in this circular way she does and does not 
escape the exclusion to which she did not wish to subscribe. This is precisely the point 
where death comes into the picture qua trope of woman’s impossibility.   
 
In ‘The Bracelet’ Xenopoulos shows how nearly untenable woman’s position can 
become in traditional patriarchal societies when she tries to represent herself in 
herself. At the same time, he shows that between the sexes there exists an irreducible 
and fundamental difference which should not be mistaken for a simple opposition: 
man and woman use signification differently. Man and woman see the same object, a 
bracelet, but assign different meaning to it.  
 
At this point a Foucauldian question pinpoints the very nature of the problem 
Xenopoulos tries to articulate in this story: when Mary wakes up to find her bracelet 
broken and with ‘a madwoman’s expression on her face, she shouts …’ If not a 
madwoman, Mary is definitely presented as ‘dazzled by reason’ (Foucault, 2001) in 
Xenopoulo’s narrative. Both man and woman look at the same thing, but not in the 
same way. One of them, is so dazzled by reason, that she can be registered as mad, 
‘madwoman’. But, we might ask whose gaze is really ‘dazzled’ here, containing the 
conditions of possibility for unreason to emerge. Xenopoulos is supposed to be 
holding a neutral position here, but as it comes, the woman’s disappearance and 
mutation after the night of the bracelet crisis, implicitly suggests that she is the figure 
which ‘dazzled by reason’ becomes unrepresentable within the symbolic order. The 
difference in signification between the sexes illuminates their relation to 
madness/unreason and death, which mark the limit of their affair. In the beginning 
man is unable to accede to the symbolic significance of the bracelet and inclined to 
provide an imaginary meaning to it. The flimsiness of his tactics is revealed at the 
moment when the man ‘dazzled by reason’ breaks the object and thus provokes the 
disappearance of the woman. In this metaphorical sequence of breakings, man himself 
kills the woman – the object in its concreteness – and afterwards in re-entering reason 
he achieves an understanding of her (its) meaning. Therefore her death, her real 
sacrifice, is the necessary precondition for meaning to arise. The woman is also 
subject to death as repetition compulsion because she is said to repeat her bracelet 
attachment elsewhere. However, her main attachment to death is one of resistance: 
with her symbolic death (departure) the woman resists being turned into a dead 
meaning and a dead image, into man’s symptom and adjunct. Thus her tactics is both 
radical and desperate: she appropriates the death inflicted upon her and turns it into 
her own signification. ‘The Bracelet’ speaks of how difficult it is for woman to 
signify herself even at the point of death and of how man and woman are two 
significations that cannot realistically meet but in their incommensurable difference.  
 
 
The Life and Death of Argyroula:  
 
In ‘The Life and Death of Argyroula’s a young woman invites her family to a dinner 
party by her death bed and prepares the event as a celebration and a spectacle. 
Argyroula, we are told, has refused to grow up and remained a big child throughout 
her life. Hence her last demand, the last in a long series of whimsical demands, and 
the familiy’s eagerness to satisfy it:  
 
Sometimes they were amused but her demands, sometimes they would get angry 
and later succumb. They would sulk and be pretend to be indifferent; they would 
despair and eventually give in. Argyroula impossible to change. To them, she was 
the living  image of the unchanchable and the incorrigible, something which is 
poinltess, ridiculous and useless to fight:  the very soul of this woman who was 
crazy like a child. (p.119) 
 
Like most of her contemporaries, Argyroula is under the constant gaze of her 
immediate family and her local community. During the period of her illness, she has 
also become the object of the observing clinical gaze (Foucault, 1975) which she 
detests and considers a form of punishment (p. 120). Death, according to Foucault, is 
the only moment when we can escape power and Argyroula prepares the feast as the 
celebration of her final escape. In setting up her death scene she is dragging the matrix 
of gazes to the point of their reversal. In making her death a spectacle, she attempts to 
turn the gaze upon her family and take up the role of the spectator. But is this really 
possible? And what does it achieve anyway given the limitations imposed upon the 
woman when it comes to her (self)representation?  
 
Obviously Argyroula has been placed by her family in the realm of unreason, but 
instead of having been declared mad, she has just been characterised ‘crazy like a 
child’. This crazy child, who refuses to lie in bed like all invalids, treats life in the 
same frivolous manner she treats illness. Argyroula rejects the marital bed and the 
invalid’s bed as emplacements of confinement in the symbolic order she has refused 
to enter: 
 
The confinement to bed, involuntary and uneasy, was the mirror image of her life. 
This was the marital bed, gilded and rich but infertile and childless. She had never 
occupied it properly either as a woman or as an invalid. She had never felt the 
need for it. She would sleep better and dream her dreams on the velvet sofa in her 
reception room or on the wicker armchair on the terazza (p. 121). 
 
When the family arrives, the gathering is stage-directed by her with the authority of 
the dying person and the panache of the narcissistic female. She orders them to talk 
loudly and enjoy themselves. They comply and drink a toast to her health. She 
attempts to join them at the table but they forbid her. After all, her powerful position 
is only relationally effective even at the time of death. The narrator wonders:  
 
Did they love her? Not quite. She had never exhibited enough maturity to attract 
real love and devotion. May be because she did not really love anyone herself. May 
be because no one was capable of seeing the truth hiding in some unknown depths. 
The certain thing is that no one loved her. Her folks always treated her with concern 
because she was one of them. And in fact some of them did not like her at all (p. 
122). 
 
Prevented from joining them at the table, Argyroula complains that she is held captive 
by her relatives. She tells them that she envies the birds that fly free and wishes she 
were one of them. Half aggressively, half mockingly she adds: ‘I want to beat you all’ 
(p. 123). This causes mirth all around the table. As she retreats to bed, the family 
forget her presence and even their effort to feign happiness. Real enjoyment overtakes 
them. Something coming from her side of the room, we are told, makes them dizzy 
more than the wine (p.123). [Like Argyroula they also are ‘dazzled by reason’.] 
Argyroula is excited by the spectacle of the happy family. She cries out: ‘hurray! 
hurray!, darts out of bed, reaches the table, lifts a glass and drinks a toast ‘to the birds’ 
inviting the others to do the same. She adds: ‘I am happy, I am so happy. This is what 
I want you to be like’ (p.124, emphasis added) and collapses on the floor. She dies as 
she crosses the line between the spectator and the spectacle. Death at that point 
signifies the impossibility of the disappearance of the gaze. The narrator adds a final 
word: ‘Silence fell on the room where they feasted for her love and without loving 
her. Sorrow and compassion overcame them, as big as Argyroula’s joy. She passed 
away without anyone ever having understood or loved her’ (p. 125).  
 
A visual stereotype is subverted by Argyroula’s last hours, that of the typical death 
scene: invalid confined to bed, passive body, sorrowful relatives, whispering voices, 
last rites. A second stereotype is subverted by her life: the belief that woman is born 
to love and be for the others. What does this woman want? As in the previous story, 
the answer is deceptively short and simple: she wants her freedom from marriage and 
social convention. Yet, both her previous record and the absurd verbal form of the 
desire to live ‘like the birds’ suggest that Argyroula appears neurotically unsatisfiable 
thoughout her life, caught, more or less, in the vicious circle of her own demands.  
 
From a Foucauldian perspective, she is trapped in a unique combination of the 
disciplinary gaze and the medical gaze. In attempting to reverse the power of the gaze, 
she manipulates the last event of her life so as to occupy the position of the ‘eye of 
power’. Although her family seem to temporarily succumb to her desire, something 
goes wrong with the process of their subjectivation – they ignore her – and the 
imperative of juridical power emerges as an effect: ‘I want to beat you all’. Delirium 
and ultimately death is given as the solution of a situation where Argyroula’s figure is 
once again rendered unrepresented and unrepresentable.  
 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the important question is whether Argiroula 
succeeds in using her death in a deliberate process of signification comparable to 
Mary’s and whether she learns something that exceeds her intentions. On a first level, 
death as the end of life also erases desire. For the woman who lived her life repeating 
her eternal demand to see her desire for freedom satisfied – erased – death is 
metaphorically the definitive answer, albeit a sarcastic ‘isn’t that what you wanted?’.  
The radical Other-death responds to her demand for freedom literally and without 
giving her the opportunity to transform it in the usual manner – e.g. this is not what I 
wanted or now I want something else. At that moment, Argyroula resembles Lacan’s 
patient who stumbles upon the crucial question of his desire in that ‘he cannot fail to 
recognise that what he desires presents itself to him as what he does not want’ (Lacan 
1992: 312).  
 
But is this to say that Argyroula’s final insight is an encounter with the deadly essence 
of her desire? The approaching physical death, the definitive cut of all discourses and 
significations, acts like a filter to life and makes the role playing of the last dinner 
multivalent, pleasurable and liberating. Thus, Argyroula’s last desire is not so much 
captured by the specific verbal demand to be free as a bird but by her overall attempt 
to stage her passing away as an oscillation between presence and absence. At the 
border of life and death, she stages an endless fort/da game in which the absence or 
death of a concrete object (the mother in Freud’s example) becomes the prerequisite 
for its symbolic representation (by a cotton reel which is thrown away and retrieved 
by Freud’s grandson) (Freud, 1991b: 283-87). Bronfen, observes that in its most 
essential form, the fort/da does not conern the missing Other as such but the ego of 
the performer who puts itself in the place of the Other and structures the whole 
incident around her/his own vanishing (Bronfen 1992: 25). We could therefore say 
that at the border of life and death Argyroula plays the earliest game of loss and 
signification: by splitting herself into director and actor and putting the latter in the 
place of the missing Other she contemplates her death as unbearable for her family. 
From that position she poses an implicit question – can you miss me? will you miss 
me? – to which the family unwittingly replies in the negative.  
 
At the end of life the woman who refused to submit to any socially prescribed roles 
seems to be learning something about the symbolic nature of all signification. When 
all is said and done, the game played by her and her family renders nothing new. Her 
death does not change them. They remain as indifferent and caring as ever. Zizek 
observes that ‘there is more truth in the mask than in what is hidden beneath it’(1992: 
34) and this case proves it: the dominant socio-cultural Other – family, husband, 
society– is unable to reply to her final call for love. It is nevertheless deceived into 
revealing its blind indifference and the flimsiness of its authority over her by falling 
for her simple bedbed ploy. It is just as ‘incorrigible’ as Argyroula but now she can 
grasp this piece of liberating knowledge by playing a game similar to theirs.   
 
And yet, the woman cannot have the last laugh or enjoy her unexpected liberation 
because it’s too late. The aggressive ‘I want to beat you’ registers her frustration at 
seeing that her death makes her available to their infinite false compassion. At the 
moment of her death, the woman actor- director is upstaged in her attempt to 
represent herself as other than object of their dominant love and infinite compassion. 
She is fixed into a dead meaning. Her death may have retroactively revised her life 
but has not saved her from the overpowering signifying practices of the Other.  
 
 
The madman with the red lillies 
 
If woman can challenge and fascinate from the border of death, can she also do so 
from the grave? How far is man’s love and grief supposed to go and what does this 
reveal for love and desire? ‘The Madman with the red lillies’ poses these questions in 
extreme form. For Popos, a young and rich intellectual from Zante, the prolonged 
mourning signifies his refusal to abandon the dead object of his desire. 
Controversially, the beloved Vasiliki who is immortalised after her death had been 
scorned when alive. The Poesque story is told by the friend-narrator.  
 
Returning to his island after a ten year absence, the narrator is told that his best friend 
is mad and lives in total isolation, served only by his old nanny. Rumour has it that he 
spends his days studying and tending to the large mansion garden which is now full 
only of red lillies. Half out of cursiosity, half out of a sense of obligation to their old 
friendship, the narrator calls on his friend who eventually agrees to see him over 
dinner. The old friend informs the narrator that he is aware of the rumous about his 
madness and in order to prove them wrong leads him in his study, a room adorned 
with vases of red lillies, and offers to read his latest work, an excellent translation of 
Francesca’s story, the fifth canto of Dante’s Inferno. The narrator soon realises that 
his friend is not mad and has remained the bright intellectual he always were. 
Foucault, however, would have observed that in modern times, art has been the 
domain par excellence where madness/unreason can be manifested (2001).  
 
After dinner the two men sit by a window overlooking the lilly garden. Popos asks the 
narrator if he remembers Vasiliki. When the latter replies that he does, Popos informs 
him that Vasiliki is dead and also that he holds himself responsible for both her death 
and her unhappy marriage:  
 
It was me who committed that crime. But how was I to know? I never trusted 
women or anyone. I did not trust her either and now I am the unhappiest man in the 
world. “Don’t let me marry the man they have chosen for me” she wrote a few days 
before her ill fated wedding, “please don’t, because I will die”. And that’s what she 
did? (p.79) 
 
As Popos fails to tell his story in a coherent manner, bursting into tears and 
lamentions and losing the thread of his narrative, the narrator has a strange feeling:  
 
the red expanse in front of me begun attracting my gaze and started looking familiar 
and more consonant with the story  I was listening to. Just like when, in the study, 
Francesca’s story seemed to chime in with  the red lillies in the vase. Suddently I 
remembered: “tell me” I interrupted my friend, “didn’t Vasiliki grow red lillies in 
her garden? (p.81) 
 
Popos confirms the connection and says that the lillies in his garden sprung from 
bulbs transplanted from hers:  
 
I look after them myslef – though I never did what I should have done in good time. 
In the spring and in the summer the garden comes alive, as if all the love that is  
buried here oozes out the grave (p.81).   
 
Alarmed by the words ‘buried’ and ‘grave’, the narrator asks his friend what he 
means. The latter leads him into the garden, in front of a tomb bearing the name of 
‘Vasiliki’: ‘That’s her grave and all you see around here is the grave of my Love...’ 
(p. 83)  The narrator interupts him, commenting the poetic gesture:  
 
Your idea to built her a cenotaph and to fill the garden with lillies is worthy of your 
poetic nature. But you did not know what was going to happen and what happned 
was not your fault. No, my friend, it was not your fault. Enough with the guilt, the 
mourning and the misery. Do not take things to extremes. I think it’s time... (p.83) 
 
Indifferent to his advice, Popos continues: ‘The priest comes regularly and reads a 
blessing’ (p.83). And leading the narrator out of the garden he whispers: ‘What you 
just saw is not a cenotaph. It is her buried there. I stole her from the cemetery one 
night’ (p.84).  
 
What we have here is the heterotopia of the cemetery, being transferred into the man’s 
garden. In Foucault’s analysis, heterotopias are peripheral emplacements disrupting 
the dominant space of lived realities (1994). Popos’ madness is structured within the 
heterotopic spatiality of the cemetery, where his lost object lies. In the previous 
stories, we saw that the relation with the woman can neither be contained in the realm 
of imaginary love nor survive in the traditional symbolic. Mary’s fiancée and the male 
participants in Argyroula’s story may have experience the tension at the edges of both 
through their affair with the dead-ly woman but have returned inside the safety of 
these domains. Popos, however, constructs an indeterminate heterotopic space 
between life and death, in which he abadons ‘order’ and social role, lives dispossessed 
of reciprocal love but gains access to his beloved.  
 
This limbo – rather than Inferno – provides a perfect other point of view for the power 
relation of the sexes and desire. In ‘The Madman with the Red Lillies’ it is man’s turn 
to have his desire satisfied literally: in an ironic self addressed ‘isn’t that what you 
wanted?’ Popos takes possession of the woman’s body and pinpoints her to a specific 
location. The dead beloved is now made available to his grief and devotion and, 
ultimately, to his subjective interpretation. She literally belongs to him. The posession 
of her as object, however, only accenuates the elusiveness of the woman. And as in 
‘The Bracelet’ before that, her fictionalisation, man’s effor to grasp the woman  
through literary stereotypes, also falls short of her ‘essence’. Woman is neither literal 
nor literary. Are we then to admit that she is the Other which eludes the masculine 
powers of representation even when he pursues her beyond pleasure and reason? Or is 
this story an extreme illustration of the pathology through which the missing object – 
literally dead or symbolically lost – is transformed into the fantasmatic support of 
male desire?  
 
It could be said that Popos is indeed the pathological male who insists on the dead 
woman because she localises the death drive for him. In Zizek’s terms, the dead 
Vasiliki is Popos’ symptom (Zizek 1992: 155), the little obstacle-construction which 
prevents him from encountering the depths of his own deadly desire. In Bronfen’s 
terms, Popos attachment to the trauma of her death and his refusal to symbolise it, 
must be sought in a much older loss, that of the maternal body (Bronfen, 1992:35) 
which is far more significant than the demise of masculinity. In either case, the ego 
with its rational powers misrecognises the attachment to the death instinct as guilt for 
a crime which, as his friend reminds him, he did not even commit.  
 
And yet, Popos is not the only desiring male in the story. The counterpart of the 
madman is the sane narrator who had once been part of the trio of friends. For him, 
who perhaps had a sexual desire for Vasiliki but never crossed to the other topos, the 
dead woman is an aberration in the symbolic, an uncanny excess which is experienced 
in all its uncanniness twice over: in the misplaced lillies in the study and in the 
frightening expanse of red in the garden. The dead Vasiliki is trapped in the narrative 
between two male desires and two incompatible spaces: the heterotopic space of 
insane desire and the symbolic space in which she cannot be accomodated. And 
although she reaches this no man’s land through no fault of her own, she can 
contaminate the law-governed symbolic with her mere presence. Consequently, the 
narrator’s desire which emerges reinforced by the voice of reason calls for her second 
death and burial, her elimination proper which will guarantee the return of and to 
normality.  
 
Reinforced by the voice of reason, the desire to ‘kill’ the woman comes in complete 
contrast to the ethos of the previous stories. If the previous stories illustrated that the 
woman cannot be easily represented in the traditional symbolic, the present story 
suggests that she should not be represented in that space. In the previous stories man 
may have been unable to love her or address her demands through love but now that 
he finally manages to possess her he either turns her into an aberration or realises that 
he desires nothing more than her elimination. Turning her into an excess of 
representation and a violation of the symbolic, may entirely be a madman’s doing but 
any (mad)man’s decision to assume the responsibility of her life and death ultimately 
curtails her freedom and makes her available to his dominant desire. As for the 
invitation to choose between the ways of the madman and sane, an invitation 
appealing to the reader’s ‘common sense’ and loathing of sacrilidge, it barely 
disguises the fact that woman is once again turned into man’s symptom and into the 
uncanny Other which threatens to turn him into her own symptom or a living dead.  
 
Considering each story on its own and all together we can say that Xenopoulos 
displays ways in which woman and man cut into each other and surprise each other, 
revealing something which is unexpected and uncanny and which turns their 
encounter into another scene, the theatre in which their failure to co-exist in social 
terms is shown to be underpinned by psychological constructions and power relations 
forcefully at play.  
 
Man’s representation of woman in his speech is closely related to his own desire and 
the representation of himself in the dominant symbolic order. Yet the ‘what I want?’ 
is eclipsed by the question of her desire, the other unanswerable mystery which 
replaces ‘woman’ in the three narratives. For man, the desire to know himself and 
indeed herself is intertwined with the will to impose power frameworks within which 
their relation can be deployed. The confessional retelling of the stories which runs as 
a red thread throughout the three narratives does not simply go down the path of truth, 
the attempt to recognise one’s mistakes and assume a critical attitude towards one’s 
acts. The three confessional narratives are also retellings of the masculine failure to 
regain control after a traumatic event. And although the final outcome affords a 
semblance of the mastery of truth,4
 
 the encounter with the woman leaves an open 
wound and the re-telling of the story always signifies the failure of turning trauma 
into symbolic meaning, into metonymy and metaphor (Ragland 1993: 97).  
To take the tread of power more intrinsically however, for the new, sophisticated, 
cultured man who revisits his past aware of having erred and still traumatised, the 
challenge of understanding means not taking advantage of his power and not using the 
superiority of his gender in rendering the woman transparent or discarding her as a 
dissolved symptom. Having being defeated in the game of dominance prescribed by 
the traditional order, the only position this man can occupy and the only position from 
which he can speak is one similar to mourning, that is, to being in the constant 
presence of his loss and to failing to complete the internalisation of the properties of 
the lost object that would eventually lead to the end of mourning. Wedged between a 
public eye that wants him masculine and assertive and a private experience that 
castrates and threatens his psycho-sexual integrity, Xenopoulos’ man assumes his 
masculinity almost as a necessity and resembles Butler’s melancholic subject (1999: 
78) by partaking in an order that affords no automatic closure and renders him 
problematic in his own grounds.   
 
But that game cuts both ways and the lack of interpretation which may be due to the 
woman’s resistance or his inability/reluctance to use power, is counterbalanced by his 
desire to hang on to the very lack of interpretation and, like Popos, to the morbid 
pleasure of re-gaining access to her dead body. Thus, while man consciously avoids 
dismissing the woman as a dissolved symptom from his dominant world, he is still 
making her the field of his own deadly desire, re-subjecting her to his unavowed 
desire to see her return as the embodiment of his own fascination with the death drive, 
asking her to turn, once again, into his symptom (Zizek 1992: 156).   
 
For this desire to remain obscure and unconscious, a sacrifice is demanded from the 
woman. Woman is called to abandon her desire, whatever that is, and accede to a 
symbolic death, traditionally to ‘being for the other’, which would resolve the 
problem of his living in the vicinity of the trauma. This is where the burden of 
meaning is passed onto her as a request – be my beloved, justify my desire – and 
where her resistance re-turns the narrative to eternal repetition.  
 
How does the phantasised woman respond to such a request? Her representation, 
enveloped within unreason, is provided by predetermined signs, the literary references 
(Eve, Desdemona, Fransesca da Rimini) which come from other narratives and other 
places and impose a dead meaning upon her. The phantasised woman cuts into 
signification just as death cuts into it, disrupts her traditional representations and 
attempts to turn herself from a passive surface upon which meaning s projected to an 
active generator. She chooses wisely: she appropriates the object of her subjection 
(bracelet) or the game of signification that pins her down as an incorrigible child. But 
when she abandons herself to the hands of the male in good faith (Vasiliki), she is 
once again swallowed up by the literary metaphors for her nature and desire.  
 
In contrast to man’s ‘what does she want?’ ‘woman’s’ biggest challenge, then, is to 
turn signification around and provide new metaphors of being and desire, survive and 
play the game not as the final act of death and vanishing but as a stable process of 
representation. As we have seen this is almost impossible. Her attempt mostly 
marginalises her, turning her ‘game’ into one of appearance and disappearance. Thus, 
in analytic terms, the woman’s attempt to gain control over death, be that in 
Argiroula’s way or with Mary’s symbolic suicide, could be read as the counter-
measure to the call that invites her to turn herself into man’s symptom. By voluntarily 
cutting off their ties with the imaginary and the symbolic, woman performs an act of 
aphanisis and transgression, through which she finally lays claim upon the ultimate 
‘object’ of her subjection, the threat of death qua masculine threat of exclusion from 
existence and meaning. For a brief moment she appears free in the literal sense of the 
word. 5
 
 
Things could not have been more straightforward: masculinity and femininity and the 
perception of the woman as opposite of man are imaginary constructs. A viable 
solution to their cross-secting interests requires a change of attitude towards alterity, a 
re-interpretation in the analytic sense. No such call is advanced by the three stories 
and instead of that, a space of impossible relations is created, a real other space in 
which man and woman do not meet but as incompatible. Man and woman lay claim 
on the same Other and on the same signification via different routes, trying to turn it 
their own way, own it, or re-claim it. Thus the three narratives create a discursive 
space, where the sex/gender battle over meaning and signification is forcefully staged, 
remaining both open and unresolved. 
 
 
References:  
 
Beaton, R. (1999), An Introduction to Modern Greek Literature, (Oxford University 
Press).  
Boothby, R. (1991), Death and Desire, (London: Routledge). 
Bordo, S. (1990) ‘Feminism, postmodernism and gender scepticism’ in Nicholson, L. 
(ed.), Feminism/postmodernism, (London: Routledge). 
Bronfen, E. (1992), Over Her dead Body, Death, Femininity and the Aesthetic, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
Butler, J. (1997) The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Connell, R. W., (2000) The Men and the Boys, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Foucault, Michel. (1975). The Birth of the Clinic: an Archeology of Medical Perception. 
(A. M. Sheridan Smith, trans.), (New York: Vintage Books).   
Foucault, M. (1990) The History of Sexuality, An Introduction, vol. 1, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
Foucault, M.  (1991a) ‘The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice for Freedom’ in 
Bernauer, J. and Rasmussen D. (eds.) The Final Foucault  (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press), pp.1-20.  
Foucault, M.  (1991b) ‘Questions of method’, a discussion in Burchell, G., Gordon, C., 
and Miller, P. (eds.) The Foucault Effect, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf). 
Foucault, M.  (1991c) Discipline and Punish, (Harmondsworth: Penguin). 
Foucault, M. (1994) ‘Des Espaces Autres’ in Dits et ecrits 1954-1988, vol. IV, 1980-
1988, (Paris: Editions Gallimard), pp. 752-762, 
Foucault, Michel (2001) Madness and Civilization, [1961]  (London, Routledge). 
Freud, S. (1991a), ‘On Transformations of Instinct in Anal Eroticsm’, in On Sexuality 
[1917], (London: Penguin), pp. 293-302. 
Freud, S (1991b), ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, in On Metapsychology [1920], 
(London: Penguin), pp. 271-338. 
Lacan, J. (1992), ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the 
Freudian Unconscious’, in Ecrits, A Selection [1960], (London: Routledge) ,pp. 
292-325. 
Rajchman, J.  (1991) Truth and Eros, Foucault, Lacan and the question of Ethics, London: 
Routledge. 
Ragland, E. (1993)  Lacan, the Death drive, and the Dream of the Burning Child, in S 
Webster Goodwin & E Bronfen (eds), Death and Representation, John Hopkins 
University Press 
Shepherdson, C (1995) ‘History and the Real: Foucault with Lacan’, Postmodern Culture, 
Vol. 5 (2) 
Varika, E. (1994), I Eksegersi ton Kyrion, I Genesi tis Feministikis Sinidisis stin 
Ellada, 1833-1907 [The Ladies’ Uprise, The Birth of the Feminist Concsiousness 
in Greece between 1833-1907] [1987], (Athens: Katarti)  
Veloudis, G. (1983) Anafores, Exi Neoellinikes Meletes [References, Six Essays on 
Modern greek Literature] (Anthens: Fillipotis) 
Xenopoulos, G. (1914), Stella Violanti ke alla dialekta diigimata [Stella VIolanti and 
Other Short Stories], (Athens: Fexis).  
Zizek, S. (1992) Enjoy Your Symptom, Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out, 
(London: Routledge).   
                                               
1 Apart from Butler, other theorists have attempted to cross the foucauldian/psychoanalytic boundaries. 
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